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1. Introduction
This brief comment addresses several, but not all, of the points made in the paper
by Robert Howse and Henrik Horn on the WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports
in European Communities – Customs Classiﬁcation of Frozen Boneless Chicken
Cuts.1
The EC–Chicken Cuts case involved a not uncommon situation, in which a
WTO Member made tariﬀ concessions in multilateral trade negotiations and
subsequently found that trade gravitated towards products beneﬁting from lower
tariﬀs. The WTOMember then attempted to address the situation by changing its
practice of classiﬁcation of one such product to subject that product to a higher
tariﬀ. While it may be frustrating to the importing Member, as a practical matter
it seems inevitable that commercial interests will always gravitate towards the
lowest-cost method of trading their goods across international boundaries. In this
case, the European Communities (the ‘EC’) departed from an established practice
of classifying imported chicken cuts that had been treated with salt under a
The views expressed in this comment, as well as any errors, are those of the author alone. I would like to
thank Petros Mavroidis, Henrik Horn, and The American Law Institute (ALI) for inviting me to partici-
pate in this project and to provide this comment.
1 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Customs Classiﬁcation of Frozen Boneless
Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R, and Corr.1, adopted 27 September 2005 (hereafter
‘Appellate Body Report’), modifying Panel Report, European Communities – Customs Classiﬁcation of
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, Complaint by Brazil, WT/DS269/R, adopted 27 September 2005, and
Panel Report, European Communities – Customs Classiﬁcation of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts,
Complaint by Thailand, WT/DS286/R, adopted 27 September 2005 (the latter cited to hereafter as ‘Panel
Report’).
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lower-tariﬀ heading (02.10, covering ‘meat_ salted_ ’) and began to classify the
increasing volume of such imports under a higher-tariﬀ heading (02.07, covering
‘fresh, chilled or frozen’ poultry).
A threshold question in disputes about the tariﬀ treatment of imports such as
EC – Chicken Cuts, therefore, is how reviewing WTO Panels should frame the
issue: in making classiﬁcation decisions, are WTO Members bound to respect
strictly the language of their concessions, or may they reclassify goods in order to
protect their own understanding of what they intended by their concessions? It is
important to approach this issue clearly : to describe the original classiﬁcation of
the goods as an ‘error’ by the importing Member, would suggest that the im-
porting Members have broad authority to remedy such ‘errors’ by changing the
classiﬁcation of goods. On the other hand, to suggest that importing Members
have limited authority to review the classiﬁcation of goods in light of changing
trading patterns and to prevent improper classiﬁcation might undermine the
mutual beneﬁt of concessions and discourage WTO Members from continuing to
make further tariﬀ concessions.
This issue arose in the dispute in the form of determining the ‘object and pur-
pose’ of the ‘treaty’ within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (the ‘Vienna Convention’), which serves as the departure
point in interpreting the WTO Agreements. The EC had argued that the Panel had
improperly relied on the ‘expansion of trade’ as an object and purpose of tariﬀ
concessions of WTO Members.2 The Appellate Body found that the Panel had
properly construed the object and purpose of the WTO Agreements generally
to include ‘the security and predictability of ‘‘ the reciprocal and mutually advan-
tageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariﬀs and other
barriers to trade’’ ’.3 This emphasis on ‘security and predictability’ strikes a proper
balance between the approaches described above by focusing on a strict
interpretation of the text of the tariﬀ concession itself to ensure that the importing
Member’s trading partners may beneﬁt from the tariﬀ concession in question,
while still permitting importing Members to ensure that their concessions are
not abused through the misclassiﬁcation of goods.
2. The WTO and the WCO
I would disagree with the authors’ description of this dispute as primarily one of
customs classiﬁcation rather than treaty interpretation. As the authors note, it is
well established under WTO jurisprudence that WTO Members’ schedules of
tariﬀ concessions form part of the WTO Agreements and may be the subject
of WTO dispute settlement proceedings in the same manner as any provision of
the so-called ‘covered’ agreements. Thus, the issue of the correct tariﬀ on imports
2 Appellate Body Report, para. 242.
3 Ibid., para. 243, quoting Panel Report, para. 7.318.
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of chicken cuts to the EC is as much a question of WTO law as, for example,
the proper interpretation of the prohibition on export subsidies. In these circum-
stances, while acknowledging the broader issue of the ‘fragmentation’ of inter-
national law mentioned by the authors, I do not see how a WTO Panel could
decline jurisdiction or formally defer its jurisdiction on this issue to the WCO
dispute resolution process. Any problem of fragmentation exists not by hazard but
by the choice of sovereign states to create discrete bodies to address particular
issues. Any confusion between the jurisdictions of those bodies must be resolved by
the sovereign states, not by the bodies themselves declining to complete the tasks
assigned to them.
3. Interpretative issues
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that treaties are to be interpreted in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose. Article 31.3(b) provides
that together with the context of the provision, the interpreter shall take into
account ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’. Three aspects of the
Panel’s and Appellate Body’s application of this interpretative approach deserve
mention.
First, the authors correctly observe that the Panel framed the issue before it
as whether the chicken cuts at issue were ‘salted’ within the meaning of, and
therefore properly classiﬁable under, tariﬀ heading 02.10, without separately
considering whether the chicken cuts might also fall within the ‘ordinary meaning’
of tariﬀ heading 02.07. By framing the issue in this manner, the Panel avoided
applying WCO rules of interpretation that apply where products are prima facie
classiﬁable under two tariﬀ headings. While it is possible that the Panel’s analysis
may have been better if it had considered that the chicken cuts were prima facie
classiﬁable under both headings, it is by no means clear that the outcome would
have been any diﬀerent. In any event, as the authors note, the parties presented the
issue to the Panel in a manner that precluded this approach, agreeing that the
chicken cuts were not prima facie classiﬁable under both headings and that, if they
were not properly classiﬁable under heading 02.10, the EC was permitted
to classify them under the higher-tariﬀ heading 02.07. Absent extenuating
circumstances, the Panel is constrained to follow the parties’ agreement on and
explanation of the issue before it.
Second, in interpreting the ordinary meaning of the term ‘salted’, the Panel did
not content itself, as many Panels frequently do, with looking at the Oxford
English Dictionary meaning of the term. The Panel stated that it was necessary to
‘test the appropriateness of those dictionary deﬁnitions against the factual context
in which the concession in question exists ’ and that the ‘factual context’ could
include ‘aspects associated with the physical characteristics of the products at
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issue’.4 On appeal, the Appellate Body recalled that dictionaries are no more than
a ‘useful starting point’ for interpretation; the ordinary meaning of a term is to be
determined according to the particular circumstances of each case.5 The Appellate
Body noted that the Panel’s term ‘factual context’ does not appear in the Vienna
Convention, but stated that it did not consider that the Panel was incorrect to look
at the elements it considered to be ‘factual context’ in trying to derive the ordinary
meaning of the term ‘salted’.6 Although perhaps not perfectly articulated, the
Panel’s eﬀort to look for ‘ordinary’ meanings in ‘ordinary’ sources other than the
Oxford dictionary is to be commended. As the limitations of dictionary deﬁnitions
become evident in future cases, it may be expected that Panels will continue to
look beyond dictionaries to other, perhaps more practical, sources in identifying
the ‘ordinary meaning’. The Appellate Body’s description of the interpretative
process as a ‘holistic exercise that should not be mechanically subdivided into rigid
components ’ should facilitate this.7
Third, regarding the Panel’s and Appellate Body’s analysis of the ‘subsequent
practice’ provision of Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention, Howse and Horn
suggest that the silence of other WTO Members cannot be considered as assent
to that practice. I would go a little further. In the present case, the EC’s practice
had changed, and the issue before the Panel was, in eﬀect, whether the former
or latter practice was WTO consistent. In such circumstances, where the WTO
consistency of the defending Member’s practice is itself the issue, it seems diﬃcult
to rely on any aspect of that Member’s practice, in itself, as evidence of the WTO
consistency of either the Member’s former or latter practice.
4. GATT Article X
The authors suggest that the case should properly have been argued under GATT
Article X, rather than GATT Article II. GATT Article X : 3(a) provides that WTO
Members shall ‘administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner’ all of
their laws and regulations aﬀecting, inter alia, customs classiﬁcation. In their view,
the EC’s reclassiﬁcation of chicken cuts was not inconsistent with GATT Article II,
but the EC’s failure to explain its understanding of its concession constituted a
failure to administer its laws reasonably within the meaning of Article X : 3(a).
As a practical matter, however, GATT Article X : 3(a) would not have been
much use to the complainants in this case. Leaving aside the question of any bias
in the EC’s decisionmaking process (and none was alleged in the case), it is not
inconsistent per se with Article X : 3(a) for the EC to review the tariﬀ classiﬁcation
of imported goods or to make decisions that change the tariﬀ classiﬁcation of
4 Panel Report, para. 7.105.
5 Appellate Body Report, para. 175.
6 Ibid., para. 176.
7 Ibid.
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those goods. Thus, the question of whether the EC uniformly and reasonably
administered its customs laws in this case would turn on the issue of whether the
EC reached a reasonable conclusion in its regulation changing the classiﬁcation
of chicken cuts.
This is, in other words, the same issue presented by the complainants in their
claim under GATT Article II. Thus, a reviewing WTO Panel probably could not
resolve a claim under Article X : 3(a) without ﬁrst considering the issue presented
by a claim under GATT Article II and, once it had done so, the Panel would be
quite likely to exercise judicial economy with respect to the further claim under
GATT Article X : 3(a). Also, from the complainant’s point of view, a ruling under
GATT Article II would essentially establish that the reclassiﬁcation of chicken
cuts was WTO-inconsistent. This would be much more valuable in terms of the
EC’s implementation than a ruling under GATT Article X : 3(a), which would
merely establish that there was a WTO-inconsistency in the EC’s decisionmaking
process. Such a ﬁnding may be of no practical beneﬁt to the exporters : on
implementation, the EC would be able to continue to classify the chicken under
the higher-tariﬀ heading, but would simply have to explain its process and
rationale more thoroughly.
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